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The Role of Excess Reserves in Modern Monetary Policy 
and Banking   
Executive Summary 
This paper provides a summary of what role excess reserves and interest paid on 
excess reserves play in Federal Reserves’ monetary policy. Fed has had the legal 
authority to pay interest on excess reserves (IOER) held by depository institutions 
after the financial crisis and IOER has since then become one of the most important 
policy tools in central banks’ disposal.  
I will first lay down the basic institutional background behind the rise of held excess 
reserves in the Federal Reserve system and go through the basics behind the current 
monetary policy regime, when markets for reserves are saturated and IOER is pos-
itive. We will find out that under current monetary policy regime, Fed can steer its 
interest rate target with IOER more effectively than before, when the main instru-
ments for interest rate targeting were Overnight Reverse Repurchase Agreements 
(ON RRP, rate at which banks can lend reserves overnight) and Open Market Op-
erations (selling and buying reserves constantly in the market to keep interest rate 
in its target zone). 
After institutional background, I will discuss, what the primary factors behind de-
mand for reserves in financial markets are. Excess reserves can act as highly liquid 
safe asset in a market where central banks have sucked most of the AAA-graded 
government bonds out of the market via their QE-programmes. Simultaneously, 
central banks have effectively manipulated the short-term interest rates and 
changed the behaviour of banks in their short-term funding needs. 
In empirical part, I will study the demand curve for reserves using two distinct price 
measures for reserves. I find implications that markets might no longer be fully sat-
urated with excess reserves, but it will demand more time and deeper research to 
make any far-fetching conclusions yet. 
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Introduction 
 
After nearly a decade of Quantitative Easing in the aftermath of the great financial 
crisis, the banking system in the United States has been saturated with excess re-
serves. Excess Reserves are reserves held by the depository institutions in the bal-
ance sheet of Federal Reserve System that exceed the minimum reserve require-
ments. Markets for reserves is said to be saturated when the demand curve for re-
serves becomes horizontal. The supply of excess reserves got saturated after Federal 
Reserve bought assets in its Quantitative Easing programmes: as the amount of ex-
cess reserves grew substantially to trillions of dollars, banks eventually became in-
different to holding more reserves as their opportunity cost regarding other short-
term investments fell in unusually low interest rate environment. Usually increase 
in voluntary excess reserves has been a sign of risk minimization of commercial 
banks during especially harsh economic downturns. Aside from the current situa-
tion, only twice in the Federal Reserve history, have the excess reserves increased 
significantly: after the market crash of 1929 and after the 9/11. 
Amount of excess reserves in the Federal Reserve System hit all time high of 2.6 
trillion US dollars in 2016 as a direct consequence of Quantitative Easing Programs 
(three large asset purchase programs conducted by the Fed after the financial crisis) 
meaning that they effectively formed over half of the entire Federal Reserve balance 
sheet liabilities. After increasing interest rates and a gradual shrinking of the central 
banks’ balance sheet, reserves have decreased since then, but still amount over 1.7 
trillion dollars and could still pose a massive money supply risk in a case of a central 
bank run of all commercial banks simultaneously. Since the excess reserves are es-
sential in understanding how Quantitative Easing works, it is also a pivotal research 
subject now, as Federal Reserve has entered the tightening phase of its monetary 
policy: Quantitative Tightening.  
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Interest on the excess reserves (IOER) has become also more important monetary 
policy tool for Federal Reserve than in the past. It is argued, that setting IOER at the 
top level of its interest rate target, Fed essentially creates an artificial floor for short-
term market rates and therefore makes monetary policy targeting more effective. 
Usually Fed has conducted Open market operations to keep interest rates in their 
target in the so-called Corridor system of monetary policy. Now, thanks to saturated 
markets of excess reserves, we have entered a new monetary policy regime: Floor 
system interest rate targeting.  
As the Fed normalizes its balance sheet by shrinking its exposure to bought govern-
ment bonds and simultaneously shrinks the supply of available excess reserves in 
the markets, banks are forced to substitute their reserve holdings for cash or bonds. 
This together with rising interest rates is essentially what Fed will be doing during 
the Quantitative Tightening of its monetary policy. Federal Reserve will reduce its 
assets by letting purchased bonds run into their maturity. As the asset side of Fed-
eral Reserve balance sheet shrinks, also the liabilities side (mainly excess reserves) 
will also decrease by same amount. The maximum monthly amount of balance sheet 
reduction will be $50 billion (Chris Waller, 2018). 
This again increases the risk exposure of banks from the current situation and could 
lead to a strong market correction in the next months as at the time also interest 
rates are going up rapidly. As well as being important tool for monetary policy, 
excess reserves are also an important buffer against systemic risks in the banking 
system, since they have effectively decreased banks risk exposure in interbank mar-
kets. Reducing excess reserves could then expose these systemic risks again in the 
financial sector. Even though Federal Reserve is inclined to decrease its reserve 
holdings in cautious and gradual manner, it is possible that some emerging sys-
temic risks might be left unnoticed: shrinking of reserves might affect different de-
pository institutions asymmetrically depending on their ability to cope to changes 
in the lending market. Therefore, to understand the risks of increasing systemic risk, 
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it is important to discuss how reserves have affected banks decision making and 
current credit supply in the banking system. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overview on how excess reserves in Fed-
eral Reserve balance sheet have changed the nature of modern monetary policy. In 
the early years of post-financial crisis, excess reserves were not especially studied 
subject, but now, as the central bank balance sheet shrinking becomes more rele-
vant, more and more research has been made on the effects of reserves in interest 
rate targeting and in banks perceived risks and credit supply. I will assess the nature 
of current monetary policy with IOER as one of Federal Reserves’ main policy tool 
and discuss the profound effects of QE in demand for excess reserves in the banking 
sector. Institutional and historical background will cover the important changes in 
US monetary policy after 2008 and walk through the difference between the previ-
ous Corridor system monetary policy and the current Floor system. The effective-
ness of the Floor system depends heavily on saturated markets for reserves, since it 
allows the Fed to choose its interest rate target and the amount of reserves inde-
pendently (Reis, 2016). When markets are saturated with reserves, the demand 
curve for reserves is horizontal and we could expect the current monetary policy to 
be effective until the supply of reserves fall substantially and move to the elastic 
part of the curve. It can be argued, that because the Floor system requires less Open 
Market Operations by the Federal Reserve, the current monetary policy has become 
more effective after the increase in excess reserves.  
Efficiency of reserves and different regulations in banking sector after the financial 
crisis can though be criticized. I will review different views on reserves and interest 
on excess reserves. The debate of monetary policy efficiency and banking regulation 
against profitability of banking sector goes way back to Friedman and has since 
been reasoned for and against among economists. So far, the Fed and the US gov-
ernment has opted for more efficient monetary policy and more prudent regulations 
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despite possible welfare effects of positive IOER.  I will finish the institutional re-
view on different exit strategies Fed could be using in its Quantitative Tightening. 
Federal Reserve has long communicated to the markets about its intensions of de-
creasing its current balance sheet closer to pre-crisis levels which would mean de-
creasing current level of excess reserves substantially lower. This could imply prob-
lems to current interest rate policies, since the amount of reserves could fall beyond 
the point of saturation making the Floor system inefficient. I will discuss this issue 
in greater detail later.  
After the discussion on efficiency of IOER and exit strategies, I will review the de-
mand for reserves, since the demand curve for reserves will also be my research 
subject in later empirical part of this thesis. The demand for reserves has been an 
important research topic long before the unconventional policies of the past years. 
Especially the relationship between interest rates and reserves has been somewhat 
popular research topic in monetary economics (i.e. Dow, 2001). To put shortly, be-
fore QE the increase in reserves was deemed merely as a hedge for uncertainty in 
the banking sector. In more detail, reserves were a hedge against uncertainty about 
the counterparty’s true balance sheet and solvency. In the current situation with 
voluntary excess reserves though, the situation becomes more interesting: Federal 
Reserve has effectively manipulated the short-term interest rates lower and changed 
the behavior of banks in their short-term funding needs. Chapter 2 will review how 
the Federal Reserve has succeeded in manipulating the banks’ demand curve for 
reserves by creating safe asset scarcity with its Quantitative Easing programs. 
In empirical part, I will replicate the regression analysis of demand for reserves 
made originally by Ricardo Reis in his paper “Funding Quantitative Easing to Tar-
get Inflation”. He found that the markets became effectively saturated with excess 
reserves after the end of 2011. My contribution would then be to extend his analysis 
with data from the last quarter of 2016 to the end of 2018. A lot has happened in the 
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matter of excess reserves in this time frame: Reserves have shrunk hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars and interest rates have been hiked five times. My hypothesis in this 
study is that markets are no longer fully saturated with excess reserves which effec-
tively means, that Federal Reserve can shrink its reserves by adjusting the spread 
between IOER and its interest rate target. The approach is far from perfect due to its 
simplicity but is still a useful tool among many others to find real answers to mon-
etary policy problems we are facing today. I indeed find some evidence that the 
demand for reserves might already be approaching the elastic part of the demand 
curve meaning that the markets are not fully saturated with reserves anymore. Al-
ternatively, banks could already be preparing in advance for the situation, where 
reserves become scarce again. Anyhow, my results indicate a difficult upcoming 
year regarding monetary policy and liquidity in the banking sector. This implies 
difficulties to the Federal Reserve balance sheet unwinding and could reveal some 
serious systemic risks in the near future, that I will discuss at the end of this thesis. 
This paper is constructed as follows: first I will lay down the historical and institu-
tional background in chapter 1. This provides the insights on the use of IOER and 
the reasoning behind increasing excess reserves in the market.  I will also present 
the theoretical background of IOER and explain the main differences in the modern 
interest rate targeting compared to previous monetary policy regime. Then, I will 
discuss the efficiency implications of interest on reserves and introduce different 
exit strategies for Quantitative Tightening. In chapter 2, I will concentrate mainly 
on the demand of reserves. Where does the demand for reserves come from? How 
has the Fed manipulated the short-term interest markets with its monetary policy? 
In this chapter, I will also present excess reserves as new safe assets in the market 
with scarce supply of investment-grade assets. In chapter 3, I will present my em-
pirical work and replicate the study of Reis of the demand for excess reserves. Fi-
nally, I will discuss my findings and conclude this paper. 
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1. Institutional and historical background 
 
In this first chapter, I will discuss the history and institutions behind current mone-
tary policy. I will start by going through the main effects of Quantitative Easing and 
reasons behind the increase in excess reserve holdings. The main takeaway from 
this chapter is to describe the shift to the use of interest on excess reserves (IOER) 
as Fed’s new main policy tool of interest rate targeting. After explaining the change 
in monetary policy regime, I will discuss different efficiency implications of this 
monetary policy. Finally, I present different exit strategies Fed could be using dur-
ing the Quantitative Tightening process. 
 
1.1 Quantitative Easing and the Rise of Excess Reserves 
 
Figure 1: Excess Reserves of Depository Institutions 2008-2018 (Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis) 
 
Excess Reserves of Depository Institutions grew from practically zero to nearly 2.7 
trillion US dollars in less than 8 years. From the figure above, we can also see when 
these reserves have been accumulated: during three different QE rounds from 2009 
to 2015. After Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) excess reserves became the single 
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most important item of the Federal Reserve Balance sheet. What makes this fact es-
pecially interesting, is that reserves are in nature, straight substitute for cash. There-
fore, they can pose an inflationary pressure if large amount of depository institu-
tions decides to bail in their reserves for cash.  
To clarify, Quantitative easing was never about “money printing” like many of its 
critics have pointed out. By purchasing sovereign bonds from the market, Fed sub-
stituted them for reserves in its own balance sheets liabilities. Therefore, money 
supply in practice, remain untouched. The interesting question here is why banks 
were seemingly satisfied in holding such large amount of reserves in their assets 
when they could have easily swapped these holdings to cash and use it for supply-
ing credit in markets. To tackle this issue, let’s first examine the market situation of 
the last ten years to understand why it has been so lucrative for banks to hold excess 
reserves. 
Firstly, Federal Reserve began paying interest on excess reserves (IOER) to deposi-
tory institutions to hold up inflationary pressures in the money supply. When cen-
tral bank pays positive interest on reserves at market rates, price level in the econ-
omy can be decoupled from total monetary assets: inflated monetary base does not 
necessarily imply higher price level, if the reserves are controlled and constrained 
(Ennis, 2018). This means, that Fed has the composition of its liabilities under con-
trol, either by being able to force banks to keep their acquired excess reserves with 
regulation or by incentivizing banks to hold reserves by paying higher IOER. The 
third option would be to substitute reserves to other than currency (which would 
increase inflationary pressures). Currency in circulation is usually referred to as 
working monetary base (excludes reserves from monetary base). Figure 2 below 
show cases the great divergence between actual monetary base and working mon-
etary base as a result of QE. If Fed would lose its control over reserves, it would also 
essentially lose control over its working monetary base growth. 
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IOER is then an important tool for Fed to control the price level in the economy 
stable even as the actual monetary base has been inflated. However, there could still 
be a limit on the supply of reserves where the actual monetary base becomes incom-
patible with stable prices even with positive interest on excess reserves. The amount 
of excess reserves banks can hold is tied to the size of their respective balance sheets 
and since banks face capital requirements together with shrinking liquidity in the 
short-term money market, the demand for reserves is linked to the total amount of 
bank capital available in the economy. If bank capital becomes scarce again, the cost 
of holding more reserves increases and their demand decreases. As more reserves 
would be substituted to currency, working monetary base starts to grow and the 
price level would again move together with the actual monetary base growth (En-
nis, 2018). This implies, that Federal Reserve cannot increase its balance sheet size 
indefinitely without causing possible inflationary pressures in the price level. Infla-
tion risk linked to the QE is then not completely ruled out and sets restrictions to 
the current and future easing policies.  
 Figure 2: Excess Reserves and Currency in circulation (St. Louis Fed) 
 
 
I will treat excess reserves as a safe asset for the banking system. Because of this, 
banks were inclined to swap their sovereign bond holdings for another safe substi-
tute in a form of excess reserves, since they provide a better liquidity and contain 
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no sovereign risk. The only risk in excess reserves in theory is monetary policy risk, 
that is, a case when markets lose their trust in Federal Reserve as a lender of last 
resort and its capability of keeping monetary policy stable. This kind of Ponzi-like 
risk in central banking has always been a possibility, but of course, the real chance 
of that happening is considered very low (since it would essentially blow up the 
whole monetary system as it exists now). Aside from lowering risks in the market, 
IOER provides banks an important incentive for not to reallocate their assets to cash.  
Secondly, despite large increase in excess reserves, credit supply has not been nec-
essarily negatively affected. Record amount of credit has been given to corporations 
and households altogether. Total US household debt has grown to over $13.5 trillion  
(New York Fed) while US corporate debt has climbed to over $6.2 trillion (St. Louis 
Fed). Excess reserves created in the QE programs indeed led to higher loan growth 
and riskier lending activity. Reserve creation can then be seen as one of the im-
portant transmission channels of QE to economic activity (Kandrac & Schlusche, 
2018). 
 
Figure 3: US Corporate debt 2003-2018 (St. Louis Fed) 
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Figure 4: Composition of US household debt 2003-2018 (New York Fed Consumer 
Credit Panel/Equifax) 
 
Thirdly, risk exposure of depository institution in interbank markets should have, 
in theory, decreased, since the need for interbank lending in short-term money mar-
kets have shrunk to minimum because of abundant excess reserves. Reducing these 
risks was initially one of Fed’s main goals in its monetary policy after Lehman col-
lapse when the trust between financial institutions bottomed. Higher interbank bor-
rowing costs after the initial Lehman crisis was caused by banks’ fears over their 
counterparties solvency and ability to pay any unsecured debt back (Taylor & Wil-
liams, 2008). 
The role of excess reserves and Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort to provide 
short-term financing in banking sector have then become even more relevant 
(Money and Banking, 2018). The increased stress in the financial system and in in-
terbank-market has also become more visible as the volatility in Libor-OIS spread 
has sharply increased during 2018. Libor-OIS spread is usually seen as one of key 
measures for credit risk and illiquidity concerns in the banking sector. The OIS 
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(Overnight Indexed Swap) rate is the most relevant measure for market expecta-
tions of future federal funds rate and LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) re-
flects the expectations for future overnight rates and credit risk (Sengupta & Man 
Tam, 2008). Increase in the spread then could be associated with liquidity problems 
in the market. 
Finally, reserves have a unique role in federal funds market: reserves are used in 
handling daily activities of depository institutions in interbank-markets.  As an al-
ternative to using reserves to meet their daily transactions with other depository 
institutions, banks can also borrow from overnight repurchase facility, which acts 
as the other important policy tool for Federal Reserve in interest rate targeting. I will 
cover both tools in greater detail in later chapters. 
 
1.2 New Monetary Policy Regime and interest rate for-
mation: from corridor to floor system  
 
Before 2008, Federal Reserve did not have legal authority to pay interest on excess 
reserves held in its system and therefore IOER was not seen as a viable policy alter-
native for reigning monetary policy system. Only after the emergency laws imple-
mented by the US senate after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in October 2008 
became IOER one of the main instruments of Federal Reserve monetary policy 
toolkit. To examine the importance of this change in monetary policy regime, let’s 
review the main aspects of the previous regime without interest on reserves com-
pared to the current regime with saturated excess reserves in the Federal Reserve 
System.   
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Figure 5 (Ireland, 2012) 
 
Figure 5 presents the simple downward sloping demand curve for reserves when 
central bank does not pay interest on its reserves. When federal funds rate falls, 
banks are more inclined to hold reserves, since the cost of holding them is lower.  
The lower the interest rate, the higher are the reserves held by depository institu-
tions. Simply put, Federal Reserve needs to issue quantity of 𝑄𝑅0 reserves through 
Open Market Operations (OMO) to hit its interest target 𝐹𝐹𝑅0 in the market. Fed as 
all major central banks then created an environment, structural liquidity deficit, 
where reserves became scarce safe asset in the markets: central bank only issued just 
enough reserves for banking system to keep its interest rates on target and to ensure 
that banks were able to meet their minimum reserve requirements (Berentsen et. al, 
2015). 
 In this way, hitting the federal funds rate target is much more difficult task than 
many could expect. Keeping rates in central bank’s target required constant opera-
tions in the markets to keep upward and downward pressures from interest rate 
speculation at minimum. Federal Reserve like many other central banks, requires 
banks to hold certain percentage of their liabilities as reserves in central banks’ bal-
ance sheet. Big institutions (with net transactions over $124.2 million) are required 
to hold 10 % of their liabilities as reserves in Federal Reserve System (Federal Re-
serve). Before Fed began paying interest on excess reserves, reserves held by depos-
itory institutions consisted mainly of required holdings and the amount of excess 
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reserves was kept at minimum. Only during big political shocks like after 9/11, the 
amount of excess reserves has spiked significantly due to uncertainty in banking 
sector (Figure 6).  Since banks cannot lower their reserve holdings below the mini-
mum reserve requirements, demand curve becomes effectively vertical on point of 
regulated required reserves. Hence, reserves cannot fall completely to zero even if 
the federal funds target increases indefinitely. I will discuss the effect of minimum 
reserve requirements in greater detail later in next chapter. 
 
Figure 6: Amount of excess reserves relative to required reserves was not significant 
before the financial crisis. (Board of Governors, St. Louis Federal Reserve) 
 
 
The system where Federal Reserve targets federal funds rate by issuing reserves via 
open market operations by the trading desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York is referred as Corridor system of monetary policy and was on effect for many 
decades until the financial crisis. After the financial crisis and after trillions worth 
of Quantative Easing (QE), the amount of excess reserves in Federal Reserve System 
however, ballooned manifold compared to required reserves. 
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Figure 7: Excess reserves of depository institutions after 2008 (Board of Governors, 
St. Louis Federal Reserve) 
 
Figure 7 shows the dramatic increase in excess reserve holdings beginning from 
September 2008. The growth rate of US monetary base during last 10 years has been 
on average 16 %, most of which has been an increase in the excess reserves. Simul-
taneously every attempt of increasing inflation has been lacklustre and general price 
level has grown under 2 % on annual average. Excess reserves have been increased 
during the three QE-rounds conducted by the Federal Reserve after 2008.  
Quantative Easing has been an area of intense research in macroeconomics during 
this decade. Most of the research have tried to understand the effects of large asset 
purchases by the Fed to the real economy and banking sector (for example: Gertler 
and Karadi, 2011) or transmission channels of QE (i.e. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2011), but until 2016 the effects on balance sheet interdependence of de-
pository institutions and central bank has been less studied. Since excess reserves 
and the interest paid on excess reserves have become the most important policy tool 
for Federal Reserve and the key for ending the decade of easy money (interest rates 
near zero, abundant reserves for depository institutions), I will now present the sim-
ple rationale behind the current monetary policy regime: the Floor system. 
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Figure 8: Floor system of monetary policy (Ireland,2012) 
  
Unlike in the previous system, Federal Reserve can now set a floor to which the 
federal funds market rate can fall by paying interest on excess reserves (IOER). It 
sets the IOER at the upper boundary of its rate target (𝑅𝑅0). This effectively de-
creases the demand for open market operations, since rates cannot fall under the 
floor set by the IOER for longer period. For any profit-seeking depository institu-
tion, it would not make any economic sense to lend at interbank markets with rates 
under IOER, when they could make more money by just parking their money in 
Federal Reserve balance sheet and earn interest on their reserves. This means the 
Fed doesn’t need to conduct open market operations in its targets lower bound since 
IOER provides the economic incentives for banks to push interbank market rates 
above that floor.  Federal Reserve has indeed invented a new approach into the floor 
system: in a way it is a floor with a subfloor, since overnight repurchase agreement 
rate is set at the lower end of the interest rate target. Federal Funds rate has usually 
lied between these two rates. It was not until Fall 2018, when Federal Funds rate 
and IOER reached parity.  Thus, to put shortly, the IOER sets the floor, and the ON-
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RRP rate sets the subfloor. I will explain these policy tools in chapter 2.3 in greater 
detail.  
In the figure 8 then, Federal Reserve can set IOER at 𝑅𝑅0 and reach its target level 
(federal funds rate between 𝐹𝐹𝑅0 and 𝐹𝐹𝑅1). It can still conduct open market oper-
ations in the upper bound of its target level and keep rates near 𝐹𝐹𝑅1 by issuing 
𝑄𝑅1 reserves in the market. However, it can also decide to let interest fall on the 
floor created by the IOER by saturating the markets with excess reserves (Reis,2016). 
Then the Quantity of reserves could be anywhere on the horizontal line of demand 
curve: for example, on 𝑄𝑅2. Note, that unlike in previous system where we had the 
downward sloping demand for reserves, now IOER makes the demand curve hori-
zontal in 𝑅𝑅0. In general, IOER has shifted the demand curve for reserves horizontal 
in 𝐹𝐹𝑅1) but has not changed the slope above the 𝑅𝑅0.  
 
Figure 9: Interest Paid on Excess Reserves (Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System) 
 
Figure 9 shows the interest paid on Excess Reserves after it was legalised in late 
2008. It was initially set at 0.75 % and was increased as high as 1.15 % in October 
2008. However, it was quickly decreased to 0.25 % as the Fed begun lowering its 
interest rates to near zero territory. During the Quantative easing –phase of mone-
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tary policy, Fed did not actively use its new mandate of IOER. Only after 2016, un-
der chair Janet Yellen, the Fed begun using it as its main instrument for raising in-
terest rates in US in the manner described as floor-system above. IOER could then 
be mainly seen as a tool for Quantative Tightening rather than Quantative Easing. 
The goal of QE was primarily to increase the amount of reserves in the Federal Re-
serve balance sheet.  Ricardo Reis (2016) pointed out, that the first two rounds of 
Large-scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) were intended to lower federal funds rate near 
zero while simultaneously pushing the amount of excess reserves to horizontal line 
of demand curve. The third and final round of LSAP only increased the excess re-
serves and left rates untouched, since the rates were already near zero (Reis, 2016).  
This explains an important aspect in the current monetary policy regime: to find its 
target near the floor set by the IOER, Fed needs to issue abundant amount of re-
serves to markets to keep them saturated with reserves. This in essence means that 
any bank in Federal Reserve System is indifferent to holding reserves and lending 
them at current interest rate levels in interbank markets. According to Reis, US mar-
kets have been effectively saturated since October 2011 and the demand curve for 
reserves has been horizontal at least until the beginning of tightening process of 
monetary policy in 2016.  US markets have then moved from structural liquidity 
deficit to structural liquidity surplus environment. 
Figure 10 Demand for reserves (Ricarco Reis, 2016) 
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Figure 10 (from Reis, 2016) is a modification to the previous figures portraying the 
demand for reserves. Now we have a vertical line at 𝑣𝑟 that was the required re-
serve balances before QE. In addition, demand for reserves is vertical near this level, 
since banks cannot freely choose the amount of reserves they wish to hold at current 
interest rate levels. The rationale behind QE was then to push down the relative 
price between IOER and federal funds rate and effectively reach the horizontal part 
of the demand curve beyond 𝑣𝑠. When markets became wholly saturated with ex-
cess reserves, Fed was able to issue any amount of excess reserves with its asset 
purchases independently of current interest rate level. Regression analysis made by 
Reis in 2016, which I will replicate with new data later in this thesis, proves that the 
markets in US were in fact saturated with reserves and the last QE-round did not 
have any significant effect on interest rates, which gives proof for this important 
hypothesis. 
1.3 Efficiency implications of reserves and IOER 
 
Next, I will discuss further the efficiency implications of paying positive interest 
rate for reserves. Discussion is tightly related to other banking regulations such as 
minimum reserve requirements. In this section I will review different advantages 
and disadvantages of minimum reserve requirements and positive IOER and then 
compare US rate policies to Europe and Japan, where both European Central Bank 
(ECB) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) have opted using negative interest rates for reserves. 
The advantages of required reserve holdings come from prudential implications, 
impacts on monetary control and on management of aggregate liquidity. Reserve 
requirements ensure that depository institutions hold at least some high-quality 
and liquid assets. The main objective is to be able to meet even the unexpected short-
run demand in the interbank markets: liquidity problems could come from domes-
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tic or international sources, so reserve requirements offset the systemic risks be-
tween banks during shocks in the banking sector. Also, this would directly ensure 
trust between banks, since they know that their counterparties in interbank market 
are regulated to hold at least some liquid assets to meet their obligations. Aside from 
liquidity and prudential considerations, reserve requirements act as important pol-
icy tool for central bank to control the credit growth and liquidity in the banking 
system (Gray [IMF], 2011)   
Advocation for paying positive interest on reserves has been around for many dec-
ades. Perhaps most famously, Milton Friedman suggested interest on reserves at 
market rates to offset distortions associated with regulatory required reserve hold-
ings.  He argued that requiring banks to hold non-interest-bearing reserves related 
to their assets, essentially meant taxing depository institutions for their deposit vol-
ume (Friedman, 1960). As a consequence, minimum reserve requirements then 
cause deadweight-losses to society: banks have incentive to discourage its custom-
ers from keeping as much money as they would otherwise want at their bank ac-
counts. Banks can alter the behaviour of its customers for example by paying lower 
interest on certain accounts. This social cost of forcing minimum reserves could then 
be offset by paying interest for reserves at similar rate to what banks would reason-
ably expect otherwise by being able to use their regulated funds (Woodford, 2002). 
Reserve requirements however are an important tool for Federal Reserve to control 
the credit flow in the economy by capping the maximum amount banks can credit 
with their monetary assets. Moreover, as we have earlier discussed, minimum re-
serve requirements offer Fed a tool to manipulate the demand for reserves to be-
come vertical at given regulated level. Without the vertical part of the demand for 
reserves, banks could choose to liquidate all their reserve holdings, leaving Fed 
without a policy tool to adjust their interest rate targets. So, in this sense, while re-
serve requirements might cause inefficiencies in the economy, they also make mon-
etary policy effective as it is.  
 21 
 
However, minimum reserve requirements might cause other frictions in the finan-
cial markets as well: banks were inclined to hold excess reserves (even before the 
markets became saturated) if the penalty from not being able to meet required levels 
of reserves was costly (i.e. liquidation of high-yield assets). Keeping more reserves 
than was regulatory necessary then increased the welfare loss of required reserves 
further (Tobin, 1982). 
Aside from social costs stemming from decreasing supply of deposits available, re-
serve requirements can cause unnecessary volatility in federal funds rate, thus caus-
ing monetary policy inefficiencies. Fed for instance, calculates the required reserves 
as average reserves over two-week period, which before adoption of the modern 
monetary policy, made volatility in federal funds market higher usually during the 
last day of the observation period (Furfine, 2000). These monetary policy problems 
are of course solved in the floor system interest rate setting when demand for re-
serves is saturated and reserves are paid interest. This system also means less daily 
volatility in federal funds rate, as banks don’t need to tweak their reserve holdings 
so actively. Floor system again, is then more effective system to target federal funds 
rate and reduces the need for mandated reserve requirements.  
So, Federal Reserve opted for more effective monetary policy when it steered the 
market to reserve-surplus environment and begun paying interest on reserves. In 
addition, the stability benefits of required reserves were also estimated to be sub-
stantial and the minimum reserve requirements were increased in Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (commonly referred as Dodd-Frank). 
Aside from setting more severe high-quality capital requirements, so called Volcker 
Rule (§ 619 of Dodd Frank) restricted banks from participating in certain risky 
hedge fund activities. Therefore, the stability benefits of reserve requirements and 
other regulations were recognized after decades of financial deregulation (i.e. im-
portant regulation law Glass-Steagall was repealed in 1999).   
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So, we have discussed the efficiency and stability implications of reserve require-
ments and interest on excess reserves. IOER is basically a stable policy tool for cen-
tral bank to change its interest rates, while reserve requirements remain as an im-
portant tool for controlling banking sector stability and risk-taking. Most developed 
countries and their respected central banks followed the example set by Fed after 
the financial crisis and begun purchasing assets in Quantitative Easing programs 
increasing their monetary base with excess reserves in their respective systems. I 
will now shortly discuss the differences in using IOER as monetary policy tool in 
Japan and EU compared to US.  
The most important difference is that in Japan and EU, central banks have kept 
IOER at negative territory unlike in US, where Fed has only paid positive interest 
rates on excess reserves. Many explanations have been presented on this peculiar 
aspect, but the major reason for ECB and BoJ to keep their interest on reserves below 
zero was to encourage banks to increase their lending by penalising reserves. The 
competitiveness of US banks has been historically better than in Europe and Japan, 
so this could be one rationale behind this policy difference. The growth in bank 
lending and credit growth has also been lacklustre in Europe after 2008 due to po-
litical risks stemming from Greek debt crisis and divergence between southern and 
northern states in EU (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Annual growth rate of bank lending in US, Euro Area and Japan 
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Therefore, while in US the IOER plays a major part in monetary policy and interest 
rate setting, ECB and BoJ mainly use it as an instrument to boost lending. It remains 
to be seen, whether other central banks follow the example of Fed and begins using 
IOER later as a tool for quantitative tightening when they begin normalising their 
interest rate policies.  
 
1.4 Exit strategies for monetary policy 
The big question regarding monetary policy today is, whether central bank can ever 
normalize its interest rates and the size of its balance sheet without negative unfore-
seen consequences in the real economy and especially in the banking sector. Quan-
titative tightening refers to the policy shift towards normal monetary policy: smaller 
Federal Reserve balance sheet with less excess reserves and higher interest rates. It 
is though unclear, what the Federal Reserve balance sheet size will be after the nor-
malization. In this section, I will briefly discuss different policy options for Fed to 
tighten its monetary policy. 
Federal Reserve has three options for normalizing its monetary policy: first, it can 
leave its current escalated levels of excess reserves unchanged by paying high 
enough interest rate on reserves for their demand to be kept at current levels. This 
would mean, that balance sheet size will remain elevated until further notice. Sec-
ond option is to substitute the reserves in the market with other different instru-
ments in Federal Reserves’ disposal: bills, reverse repos or term deposits. Third op-
tion is to start selling assets purchased during QE-programmes back to the markets. 
As the assets in balance sheet shrink, also the amount of reserves in the liabilities 
will shrink to the same extent. The third option is the only viable solution, if Federal 
Reserve aims to reduce its balance sheet closer to pre-crisis levels. Other two options 
leave balance sheet elevated but reduces the amount of excess reserves in the bank-
ing system. (Berentsen et al. 2018) 
 24 
 
So far, Federal Reserve has indeed committed to reducing its balance sheet closer to 
pre-crisis levels from current $ 4.5 trillion. The plan is to gradually increase the 
monthly balance sheet shrinking to maximum of $50 billion (FOMC, 2017a. Adden-
dum to the policy normalization principles and plans). The plan is however to hold 
more reserves after the normalization than before the crisis. Estimations for the bal-
ance sheet size range between $ 2-2.5 trillion and the likely amount of excess re-
serves might be as low as $500 billion (Jim Bullard [St. Louis Fed], 2018). Be that as 
it may, the conclusive answer for likely balance sheet size has not yet been commu-
nicated by the FOMC.  
It seems that, Federal Reserve has opted to combine the reduction of reserves by 
absorbing them with reverse repos while it has also begun its gradual balance sheet 
reduction operation by either letting its asset holdings run into maturity or selling 
them back to markets. So far, Federal Reserve balance sheet has however only re-
duced by nearly $400 billion (Note, that the QT has only begun with gradual in-
creases during 2018).  
 
2. Demand for Reserves 
In this chapter, the demand for reserves is discussed in greater detail. What impli-
cations does the current safe asset scarcity have on the demand for reserves and 
how Federal Reserve can manipulate the shape of the demand curve to its liking? 
First, I will discuss previous research on the subject and the behavior of banks in the 
market for reserves. Then I will examine the interest rate policy of Fed and how the 
central bank can change banks’ behavior by incentivizing reserves via interest on 
reserves. 
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2.1 Longing for safe assets and hedging against uncertainty 
Thus far, I have covered the rationale behind Federal Reserve’s new monetary pol-
icy regime with abundant reserves and interest on excess reserves as a tool for in-
terest rate targeting. In this chapter, I will discuss different reasons for depository 
institutions to hold larger amount of excess reserves in their balance sheets. Central 
bank has supplied the markets with trillions of dollars’ worth of reserves, but where 
does the demand for these assets come from? My argument in this chapter is, that 
tightened minimum reserve requirements and other bank regulations such as 
Dodd-Frank have forced banks to adopt more reserve-oriented balance sheet poli-
cies. This together with increased banking sector risks in post-financial crisis era 
and decreased safe asset supply have provided favourable environment for current 
monetary policy to flourish. Next, I will discuss these considerations in more detail. 
The relationship between excess reserves and Federal funds rate has been an im-
portant research topic in monetary economics for long time. For example, James 
Dow (2001) found a negative relationship between Fed funds and excess reserves. 
One percentage increase in rates was associated with roughly $ 120 million decrease 
in excess reserve holdings. The data was collected from the 1990s and has some im-
portant message to consider in our current context. First of all, no interest was paid 
for excess reserves until 2008, so banks willingness to hold excess reserves was due 
to changes in short-term interest rates and regulatory changes. Since short-term in-
terest rates are in essence opportunity costs for holding excess reserves, the changes 
in rates should have inverse relationship with reserve holdings.  
Dow was not the first one to find this inverse relationship as feasible assumption in 
monetary policy: for example, Hamilton (1997) found even larger elasticity than 
Dow did. One percentage-point change in Federal funds rate was associated with 
as much as $300 million change in excess reserve holdings. Note, that both results 
were “only” in millions of dollars, as nowadays the amount of excess reserves are 
calculated in billions and even in trillions. The simple comparison between different 
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rates and amount of reserves, which was used in these research papers, was rather 
simple and could not really take into account different changes in regulatory envi-
ronment of that time. The rate spread approach to amount of reserves has been re-
searched only recently (most notably, Reis 2016), which provides more sophisti-
cated results on the subject (since the rate spreads themselves provide important 
information on the opportunity costs between different rates and services). 
Another proposition from Dow is that excess reserves provide a buffer for banks 
against uncertainty about their own balance sheet. This implies that demand for 
excess reserves should then increase with uncertainty. The general model of the pre-
cautionary demand for reserve holdings by Poole (1968) assumed that increase in 
transactions deposits increases uncertainty: simply put, more banking activity 
causes more balance sheet uncertainty that again increases demand for relatively 
safe excess reserves. This assumption holds, when there is a scarce supply of safe 
assets in the markets and excess reserves are easily acquired. Central bank can then 
manipulate the shape of demand curve by increasing minimum reserve require-
ments or restricting risk taking, which in essence forces banks to hold more safe 
assets as a hedge against its risky investments. Now, let us consider the post-GFC 
(Global Financial Crisis) monetary policy for a moment. Central bank has indeed 
forced banks to hold more safe assets by increasing regulations (i.e. Dodd-Frank). 
Simultaneously it has decreased the supply of safe assets in the markets by purchas-
ing relatively safe government treasury bonds and adding them in its balance sheet. 
Federal Reserve and other central banks have then substituted safe assets in ex-
change for excess reserves.  
 
2.2 Demand curve alteration: how it’s done 
Banks face a choice between highly liquid reserves and less liquid short-term debt 
obligations such as 3-month T-bills that can be used to finance their purchases in 
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interbank market. Prior paying interest on reserves, this meant a trade-off between 
liquidity and the possible rate of return banks got from holding securities. 
When a bank needed a quick credit to finance its daily trades, it needed to sell secu-
rities to meet its credit in reserve markets (Fedwire). Reserves were scarce, so one 
had to borrow them from other banks. If for instance bank had excess reserves (to 
meet its requirements and to use them as a currency in trades), it would not need to 
rebalance its balance sheet but only would pay directly with reserves.  
Now, as markets for reserves are saturated, the need for borrowing in interbank 
markets has declined. This can also be seen as Fed objective to reduce the perceived 
risk in the interbank market that was deemed high after the financial crisis and 
banks were more cautious in dealing with other banks in reserve trades. (Hendrick-
son, 2017) 
Now with abundant excess reserves and strongly positive interest paid on excess 
reserves, reserves are no longer just a law-enforced liquidity requirement, but also 
a highly liquid, interest-bearing monetary asset for depository institution. To put it 
the other way, banks no longer need to make a trade-off between liquidity and rate 
of return like they used to make.  For bank productivity this has of course some 
important implications: settlements of payments in the interbank market becomes 
more efficient as there is no longer market friction caused by the time and effort it 
takes to sell the less-liquid assets to maintain banks daily solvency. 
Another important implication is that paying interest on excess reserves makes 
monetary policy less effective in a sense of portfolio reallocation mechanism: why 
would a bank that is credited with freshly printed interest-bearing reserves allocate 
its reserve-holdings if it is awarded with high interest for only holding the reserves. 
IOER was higher than 3-month T-bill for long time after the financial crisis, so the 
substitution was mainly between reserves and T-bills and no other reallocation then 
would emerge. (Bernanke,2010) 
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Federal Reserve has in a way destroyed the original market mechanism in the fed-
eral funds market and replaced it with their own liking. With IOER, Federal Reserve 
had a negative and significant effect on the demand for daylight overdrafts and in-
deed increased the demand for bank reserves (Hendrickson, 2017).  Also, by buying 
highly valued T-bills (safe assets), Federal Reserve forced banks to adopt more re-
serve-rich strategy. In hindsight then, QE was mainly a tool for changing banks’ 
behaviour in the short-term interest market (to become more reliant on reserves ra-
ther than overnight facilities) and made a significant impact on interest maturity of 
outstanding US public debt. 
2.3 Policy implementation 
When reserves are scarce, banks borrow reserves from other depository institutions 
to meet their demand for reserves. Those with excess reserves want to get rid of 
their excess holdings while banks in shortage of reserves need to acquire them in 
the interbank market. When reserves are plentiful, like today, the need for interbank 
lending decreases. As a result, share of interbank trades in the federal funds market 
has decreased to unforeseen low levels. (Armenter & Lester, 2017) 
Federal Reserve Open Market Committee laid down the ground rules for normaliz-
ing its monetary policy already in September 2014: Committee intended to use IOER 
as its main tool for raising the federal funds rate target while using Overnight Re-
purchase agreements (ON RRP) facility only when necessary. ON RRP rate is the 
other important policy tool for Federal Reserve, which provides short-term capital 
and collateral lending for depository institutions at fixed rate. Its policy significance 
has in recent years fallen (demand for reverse repos shrunk to all-time lows in 2018) 
and instead IOER has become the most important tool in Fed’s disposal for interest 
rate targeting.  
To give an example for the implications one can take away from this: Overnight 
reserve repurchase agreements are transactions, where Fed sells a security to a bank 
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and agrees to buy it back the very next day. This temporarily changes the composi-
tion of Federal Reserve liabilities and it is paid positive rate offered by the Federal 
Reserve. The rate of ON RRP is set at the lower end of the Federal Reserve interest 
rate target. In general, any bank that is eligible to use ON RRP facility, is then un-
willing to invest its funds overnight at lower rate than the rate set by the Fed with 
other counterparties.  If Fed moves IOER (that is set at the higher end of Fed interest 
rate target level) and ON RRP (that is set at the lower end of Fed interest rate target 
level) in parallel keeping the spread between the two rates constant, also the target 
zone (usually 0.25 spread) moves one-to-one with the change in the two rates. In 
theory, the effectiveness of this kind of rate adjusting strategy was positive already 
before Federal Reserve begun implementing this strategy starting from 2016 (Ar-
menter & Lester, 2017). 
Where the market rate between the two policy rates actually lies is determined by 
the volume of activity: if most interbank short-term funding is being handled with 
reserves, market rate hikes closer to the high end of the target spectrum. If on the 
other hand reserves become scarce, banks are forced to use overnight facilities.  
 
Figure 12: Target Range  
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Figure 13: Spread between Federal Funds rate and IOER has shrunk during the 
tightening phase (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,2018) 
 
 
So, for a qualified depository institution, there are two alternatives in the federal 
funds market: Use Overnight Facility to borrow reserves from other banks or to use 
own excess reserves. Lately, federal funds rate has been hiking towards the upper 
end of the target range (see Figure 13 above), which implies that depository institu-
tions are using more and more of their excess reserves to meet their daily monetary 
needs. This could be due to shortage of dollars which makes cash more expensive 
in interbank markets. Then the only viable option is to shrink excess reserves and 
substitute them to more liquid form of money.  
Federal Reserve has also started to change the spread between ON RRP and IOER 
when it increased the IOER by only 0.2 % while raising the ON RRP rate by 0.25 %. 
This could imply some policy shift considering IOER in the future, which Fed is 
already starting to examine. On the other hand, Fed might want to control the speed 
at which the excess reserves are currently shrinking by trying to steer some banks 
back into the ON RRP markets. 
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Figure 14 & 15: How Federal Funds rate has moved in the target range during 2012-
2018 (St. Louis Fed) 
 
 
Figure 15: Federal funds rate has creeped higher towards the IOER (spread de-
crease) 2016-2018  
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3. Empirical Approach  
The empirical part of this thesis is a replication of study made by Ricardo Reis (2016) 
on the demand for excess reserves. Reis argued that the markets were effectively 
saturated with reserves since late 2011 (after the end of second round of QE), which 
made it possible for the central bank to increase or decrease its reserve supply inde-
pendently from its interest rate policy. Reis argued that since markets were properly 
saturated, the third round of QE beginning in 2012 had no real effect on interest 
rates and was only used to increase further the supply of excess reserves in the US 
banking system. Indeed, his regression showed, that the supply of excess reserves 
had long surpassed the horizontal part of the demand curve (please revisit Figure 
10 if needed). I will continue to work on this same topic here.  
My hypothesis in this study is that markets have lost their saturation with excess 
reserves at some point during 2018, which effectively means, that Federal Reserve 
can shrink its reserves by adjusting the spread between IOER and its interest rate 
target. Fed has already tested this in the market twice during 2018, when it surpris-
ingly raised IOER only by 20 points while raising its target by 25 points higher in 
June and later in September (see shrinking spread in figure 13). By playing with the 
spread between federal funds rate and IOER, Fed can force financial institutions to 
move away from excess reserves and begun meeting their short-term monetary 
needs with treasury bills or notes. Therefore, I expect to find inverse relationship 
between the spread of IOER-FF (Interest on Excess Reserves – Federal Funds rate) 
and the change in held excess reserves by depository institutions. Simply put, when 
Federal Funds rate falls closer to the lower end of the interest rate target zone, it 
becomes more tempting for depository institutions to hold excess reserves as op-
portunity cost for federal funds rates increases: banks get better comparable rate of 
return from reserves. 
In addition, when the spread between IOER and short-term Treasury bills (3-month 
T-bill) increases, banks are more inclined to hold more excess reserves to meet their 
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short-term debt obligations in the federal funds market. Higher T-bills mean that it 
is more expensive for banks to liquidate these holdings compared to dealing their 
daily operations with reserves. Therefore, we should see positive relationship be-
tween IOER – T-bill spread and the amount of excess reserves. 
The end product of this empirical work is a simple time series regression of two 
different rate spreads to the amount of excess reserves held by the depository insti-
tutions. Reis used log real reserves as the dependent variable in all regressions, 
while using either the spread between IOER and FF or IOER and 3-month T-bill as 
the explanatory variables. Table 1 explains his approach: explanatory variables are 
regressed one at the time with and without estimated trend (columns 1-4) while 
column 5 gives results for both variables during time period of 2011-2016. This was 
the time frame markets for reserves were expected to be saturated. Column 6 pro-
vides an important comparison point, since the observation period includes time 
before 2011.  Since the parameter estimates (measuring the semi-elasticity of de-
mand for reserves in respect to the interest rate spreads) of results is higher during 
the time when markets were not saturated for the whole period, we can assume, 
that the demand curve has indeed moved further to the right after 2011 (semi-elas-
ticity of reserves closer to zero). Unsurprisingly since the markets are not saturated 
during most of the observation period in column 6, results are more significant and 
shows larger elasticity of demand for price changes (measured as spreads IOER-FF 
or IOER-T-bill). These results reflect the change from elastic part of the demand 
curve to horizontal where amount of reserves no longer have effect on short-term 
rates.  
Reis’ main findings in his regression were that a one standard deviation increase in 
the difference between the interest on reserves and federal funds rates (of 4 basis 
points) would lower the demand for reserves by 0.8% (see column 5 in Table 1). The 
semi-elasticity of reserves to interest rates were not statistically different from zero, 
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which can be seen as indicating proof that markets were nearly wholly saturated 
during the time period after late 2011 to 2016.  
 
Table 1: The Demand curve for reserves (Reis,2016) 
 
All the data for my replication is constructed from Federal Reserve Data. I expand 
Reis’ data from late 2016 to November 2018. The measure for reserves is the natural 
logarithm of monthly real reserves (adjusted for CPI inflation). I also use two 
measures to capture the price of reserves in the markets: the IOER-FF spread and 
the spread between IOER and 3-month Treasury bill market rate. As argued by Reis, 
these measures should correctly capture the opportunity cost of holding excess re-
serves to short-term funding needs of depository institutions. I will use simple re-
gression evaluate how the relationship between rate spreads and the amount of ex-
cess reserves has worked out during the observation period.  
My approach is, here due to its simplicity, far from perfect and most likely will con-
tain some omitted effects that are not correctly observable in my data. However, 
observing the spreads between prices and the real amount of excess reserves should 
correctly give clues of the price mechanisms in the short-term money market. In the 
future though, bank-level data on reserves would be more satisfactory approach, 
since it would better capture the differences between institutions in federal funds 
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market. It is reasonable to believe, that there are differences between different de-
pository institutions in their saturation for reserves and as reserves shrink, it is the 
smallest institutions that are most vulnerable to interest rate increases (as their re-
serves intuitively fall towards the required reserves first and hence face liquidity 
constraints first of all depository institutions). 
3.1 Regression results 
Table 2: Regression results with my data 
 
Results for my regression are shown in table 2 above. First five columns are similar 
to Reis’ regression but added with data from summer 2016 to November 2018 (num-
ber of observations now 83). Observations begin in May 2016, when markets for 
reserves were effectively saturated after the second round of Quantitative Easing. 
My results indicate little lower explanatory value for the spread between IOER and 
Federal Funds rate (iRiF), but the results seem to be slightly more accurate with 
lower standard errors than Reis. As expected, IOER-FF is negatively related with 
Amount of held reserves. Demand for reserves seems to have been very close to 
horizontal: results are very close to zero and have better explanatory value statisti-
cally than the previous regression with more limited timeframe.  
Column 6, which contains all months from 2008 to late 2018, again reflects the high-
est effect in IOER-FF spread. Since the data includes not only the time when reserves 
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were more scarce and begun to rise significantly, but also time period beginning 
from 2016 when simultaneously Federal Reserve begun its interest rate hiking and 
reserves started to decrease. Value of reserves has dropped nearly one trillion dol-
lars since then. Markets then might not be completely saturated with reserves any-
more and the increasing spread between these rates by four basis points decreases 
the amount of held reserves by 1.2 % (Reis: 0.8 %). My results then indicate a greater 
economic significance of rate spreads than earlier research and imply that, when 
markets become less saturated, the interest rate spreads will likely lead to steeper 
reduction in held reserves than expected. This provides important implications for 
monetary policy as well, since it is in Federal Reserve’s interests trying to withhold 
the inflationary pressures from decreasing excess reserves. If Federal Reserve can-
not control the change in its liabilities (excess reserves flight to safety faster than Fed 
is able to reduce its assets), then we should assume to see increase in working mon-
etary base (monetary base excluding excess reserves), which would again increase 
inflationary pressures in money markets. In Figure 16 this is already visible as the 
share of “other liabilities” has increased after 2016: Fed has substituted some excess 
reserves for bills, reverse repos or term deposits as it can’t shrink its balance sheet 
too fast in this situation. 
Figure 16: Federal Reserve Balance Sheet composition 
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In the column 7 then, data from June 2016 until November 2018 is shown. My aim 
was to observe the price effects of only the period, when Federal Reserve begun 
raising its interest rates, but due to low number of observations during this period 
(31) it is very difficult to make any bigger assumptions of this and the significance 
of these results remain small. To better identify, whether there have indeed been 
any significant structural changes in my data after 2016, I run a simple Chow test 
(Chow, 1960). This test should tell whether the regression coefficient is different 
when data set is split. I split my observations to two parts: first part is from 2008 to 
December 2015 and part two is from January 2016 to November 2018.  
Null hypothesis of this test is that there is no structural change between periods 
(there is no break point in the data). If we are able to reject this hypothesis, there has 
been a significant change in demand for reserves after 2016. The regression tables 
for both time periods and formula for Chow test can be found in the Appendix. 
Here, result for the test statistic 41.45 is higher than the critical F-value 5.89, meaning 
that the null hypothesis can be rejected and hypothesis of structural change in the 
data will stand 1 . One can then argue, based on these results, that interest rate 
spreads are of large economic importance for the future of monetary policy and will 
affect the amount of reserves in the system heavily as the reserves shrink more from 
their current status. We could assume to see more relevant changes in the saturation 
of reserves during next year, if the current quantitative tightening continues as ex-
pected. 
 Longer observation period in the future though would of course provide better an-
swers on whether markets are no longer saturated. If we would observe greater ef-
fect in IOER-FF, it would be safe to argue that the demand for reserves is closing in 
to the elastic part of the demand curve. Then markets would no longer be saturated 
                                                          
1 Test gives very similar results with observations split only after June 2016. 
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and Federal Reserve could push down its reserve holdings (and consequently its 
balance sheet size) by tweaking the spread between its policy rates. 
The sign of the IOER - T-bill spread is as expected. Results indicate that as the spread 
between IOER and 3-month T-bill increases, also the amount of excess reserves will 
increase significantly. One possible reason for this might be, that as the US govern-
ment debt keeps increasing at alarming speed, it will also push excess amount of 
AA-grade collateral (in the form of T-bills) to the market. As T-bills become abun-
dant, the need for using ON RRP for banks decreases as they can also meet their 
needs in the federal funds market with using their excess reserves (that increase as 
US treasury prints more debt). However, this might also be a warning sign that li-
quidity in the federal funds markets is drying up fast: overnight facility is already 
non-existing and excess reserves are now shrinking fast: nearly 400 billion worth of 
reserves has already vanished this year.  
4. Discussion 
My study strengthens the view that the situation in money markets had already 
changed after the Fed ceased QE and began QT. Even if, the results are not com-
pletely straight-forward and explanatory, it is visible, that some profound changes 
are already happening in demand for excess reserves in the market during the QT-
phase of monetary policy. Still, my empirical work provided some important impli-
cations on how amount of excess reserves depends on changes in short-term interest 
rates. For future research, more detailed bank-level data would be needed to exam-
ine the behaviour of depository institutions during Quantitative Tightening. More-
over, as IOER and Federal Funds rate have reached parity just at the time of writing 
this paper, it will be interesting to see what effects the inversion of yield curves in 
short-term interest markets has.   
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Risks are in principle, known unknowns: they are measurable shock events that 
could occur with some probability in the future and can be hedged against. Un-
known unknowns on the other hand, are immeasurable uncertainties. Something 
that is either impossible to consider as a possibility or its probability is deemed too 
insignificant for it to be considered as a threat. At this point, shrinking of Federal 
Reserve balance sheet could pose some unforeseen threats to the global financial 
system: main concern is that liquidity in the short-term interest market dries up 
suddenly, if Fed keeps on hiking its rates too fast. On the other hand, increasing US 
public deficit (which is financed with freshly issued T-bills) might provide an im-
portant safe asset supply to the markets when it needs it the most. This of course is 
dependable on the fact, that markets keep trusting in US governments’ ability to 
meet its outstanding debt obligations. Possibility of complete loss of trust however 
remains somewhat unlikely, since the bond prices are currently at all-time highs.  
Thus far, Federal Reserve does not see any connection between reduction in excess 
reserves and upward pressure in federal funds rate (FOMC, September 2018). The 
blame for rising short-term rates (especially Treasuries) are due to glut of T-bills in 
the market, as the current US administration runs all-time-high budget deficits that 
it finances with fresh Treasury issuances. The increase in supply of Treasury bills 
has also led to a quick increase in yields even of the short-term T-bills, that as we 
have discussed, are important substitutes for banks in short-term liquidity manage-
ment. Increased yield differential between IOER and 3-month T-bill then has raised 
the incentive for holding these bills, while the risks of rising public debt does not 
seem to be any concern for financial markets at the moment. 
 It is though difficult to outright approve the rising T-bill glut as the only viable 
explanation for sharp decrease in reserve holdings while FF rate is seemingly get-
ting out of Feds’ direct control. It can be claimed, that when Federal Reserve de-
creased the spread between IOER and ON RRP to 20 basis points, it also affected 
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the incentives for holding excess reserves to the extent, that some depository insti-
tutions decided to bail out their reserve holdings for assets with better expected rate 
of return: Treasuries. As Fed has already communicated its rather hawkish interest 
rate policy for the upcoming year and has implicated already that it will not increase 
IOER at same pace than its target range for FF, it becomes more lucrative for banks 
to reallocate their asset holdings away from reserves. Research suggests, that central 
bank might need to adopt some additional tools to manage its quantitative tighten-
ing without causing inflationary pressure from speculative run out of excess re-
serves. Possible tools to offset speculation within central banks’ liabilities could be 
increased reserve requirements (involuntary excess reserves) or politically hard fis-
cal-policy intervention (Bassetto & Phelan, 2015).  
A sharp decrease in reserves does not directly imply that demand for reserves is 
currently not saturated, but the future expectations for interest rates could already 
alter the demand curve in a way, that is not modelled in current theories of demand 
for reserves. Therefore, future expectations for federal funds rate should be intro-
duced to theory of demand for excess reserves in future research. 
Even though Federal Reserve does not communicate any sign of concern of its in-
terest rate targets and heavy issuance of Treasuries are not necessarily under their 
mandate to worry about, it is clear that the Fed is monitoring the rate environment 
with growing concern. As the federal funds rate has already surpassed the IOER 
and is closing the upper limit of its target range, it is reasonable to believe Fed is 
already afraid of losing control over its interest rate targets. FOMC conducted a sur-
vey during October-November on whether banks will withdraw their reserve hold-
ings if FF would be higher than IOER (FOMC Minutes, November 2018). Report-
edly, banks were inclined to increase their lending in overnight repo markets (ON 
RRP) if FF would be modestly higher than IOER for longer period of time.  
In addition, the banks’ lowest comfortable amount of excess reserves after QT is 
surveyed to be as high as $600 billion (Senior Financial Officer Survey, September 
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2018). That is, banks are not willing to let go of the current reserve-surplus environ-
ment. At current tightening pace, the level of reserves would most likely be closing 
this level already in 2020. Moreover, the same survey indicated that banks would 
most likely reduce their reserve holdings substantially if the opportunity cost be-
tween short-term interest rates and IOER (spreads) would increase by more than 5 
basis points. Therefore, my earlier hypothesis that Fed can force depository institu-
tions to let go of their excess reserves holdings by adjusting the spread between 
federal funds rate (and short-term T-bill rates) and IOER is seemingly correct.  
This result adds to Federal Reserve’s concerns over the stability of their floor system 
monetary policy and gradual balance sheet reduction. Moreover, Federal Open 
Market Committee has already directed the Desk (New York Fed trading desk) to 
undertake open market operations when necessary to maintain FF at its target 
range. Fed is then already coming back to its old tools of interest rate targeting im-
plying, that the faith in floor system is teetering as reserves shrink and the interest 
rates are going up. It is then reasonable to forecast, that the Fed is forced to move 
back to its previous Corridor System monetary policy earlier than expected if the 
demand for reserves becomes more elastic. 
This rather odd situation in the federal funds market implies that something ex-
traordinary is about to happen upcoming months. There already exist signs that 
demand for reserves is no longer saturated. Even though the signs remain weak, it 
seems that markets are already pricing in the expectations of reserve scarcity in the 
federal funds market. For Fed, a short pause in the hiking cycle or at least reassuring 
communication of its future policy shifts, would be a good idea to calm the current 
market situation and gain back control over increasing federal funds rate. Ending 
the QT prematurely, however, could stir unwanted speculation and uncertainty in 
the markets about the direction of the monetary policy. Federal reserve chairman 
Jerome Powell tried to mitigate these fears in January 20192: Fed would continue to 
                                                          
2 “Statement Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation and Balance Sheet Normalization”, January 2019 
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implement monetary policy in the floor system with an abundant supply of re-
serves. However, Powell did issue a warning that the current estimate for the sup-
ply of reserves to keep markets saturated is quite uncertain and might even be larger 
than they expected in the early 2018. This implies, that Federal reserve is indeed 
even more likely to end its balance sheet reduction earlier than it had originally 
intended. This again strengthens the view, that the demand for reserves is currently 
moving in to the elastic part of the demand curve as my results suggested. For Fed-
eral Reserve, the difficult part of QT will then be to evaluate the right supply of 
reserves and hence the right size of the balance sheet before their current floor sys-
tem becomes ineffective. 
Even the president of the United States, Donald Trump, has famously criticised Fed-
eral Reserve in public about raising rates and shrinking the balance sheet too fast: 
“I hope the people over at the Fed will read today’s Wall Street Journal Editorial before they 
make yet another mistake. Also, don’t let the market become any more illiquid than it already 
is. Stop with the 50 B’s. Feel the market, don’t just go by meaningless numbers. Good luck!” 
- Donald J. Trump, 18 December 2018 
Direct political criticism towards independent Federal Reserve is quite unprece-
dented in modern times, even though there are some lessons from history about the 
presidential interference in the Feds’ policies. Famous examples include Lyndon B. 
Johnson physically attacking then-Fed Chairman William McChesney in 1965.  
Richard Nixon again forced Chairman Richard Burns to ease monetary policy be-
fore 1972 election that has been seen as dangerous precedent to upcoming inflation-
cycle that was not eased until the 1980s. Even Ronald Reagan administration pres-
sured chairman Paul Volcker not to raise rates further before election of 19843. Aside 
from that incident, the success of Paul Volcker Fed chairmanship could not have 
                                                          
3  Paul Volcker in his 2018 memoir ”Keeping At It: The Quest for Sound Money and Good Government” by 
Christine Harper and Paul Volcker 
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happened without wide mutual respect and trust between the administration and 
the Federal Reserve.  
The newly escalated populist anger against Fed’s actions however could pose un-
precedented dangers to the credibility of US monetary policy and global QE as well. 
Any sign of backing off from the monetary policy tightening after stark criticism 
could be interpreted as Federal Reserve giving in to political pressure. Historical 
predecessors indeed show, that weak Fed Chairs have the tendency to yield against 
the presidents will. Real danger of course is, that Fed will not be able to raise interest 
rates enough before the next crisis, which would leave little room for monetary pol-
icy to operate. The previous toolkit of lowering interest rates to zero and issuing 
more reserves via QE would be insufficient as the balance sheet remains elevated 
and rates are still historically low.  
The uncertainty about the short-term monetary policy is indeed climbing. Federal 
Reserve quite surprisingly communicated about the possible drawdown of balance 
sheet reduction in January 2019 FOMC meeting. As said, this could prove to be a 
good idea to calm the markets but slowing the pace of QT could on the other hand 
send all the wrong signals about the competence and independence of the central 
bank. Also, it would of course not solve the problem of increasing supply of T-bills 
in the market and growth in their respective yields, which are also a growing con-
cern for Fed, that has also its own skin in the game as one of the biggest shareholders 
of Treasury bills. Even though it is not directly under Federal Reserve mandate, this 
effectively means that asset price stability is under Feds’ interests, since Treasuries 
and mortgage backed securities make up a large portion of Federal Reserve balance 
sheet.  
Moreover, if bonds market prices are declining due to increase in their yields (bond 
price usually decreases as its rate of return increases), Fed is more likely to face more 
paper losses by rolling over its balance sheet via QT. As Federal Reserve calculates 
its balance sheet with face value of its assets, the difference in face value and market 
 44 
 
value will cause Federal Reserves’ net worth to fall negative as the central bank can-
not offset its liabilities (that are calculated in face value) by same amount as assets 
(that are calculated now in market value). Theoretically, this does not matter and 
won’t put Fed’s solvency into jeopardy, but it might put the credibility of Federal 
Reserve’s competence into question. This again implies, that Fed might need to end 
its balance sheet reduction earlier than expected, to keep its balances and credibility 
in check.  
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Appendix 
Chow test Formula:  
𝐹 =  
(𝑅𝑆𝑆1 − 𝑅𝑆𝑆3)/(𝑘 + 1)
𝑅𝑆𝑆3/(𝑁 − 2𝑘 − 2)
 
 
Simple regression table for whole period and for for 2008-2015 & 2016-2018 
 
